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Abstract
This paper examines the e⁄ects of exclusive dealing contracts in
a simple model with manufacturers-distributors relations. We con-
sider entrants in both manufacturing and distribution sectors. It is
well-known that a potential entry threat is welfare increasing under
homogenous price competition, even though the potential entrant is
less productive. This paper reexamines this intuition by employing
the above model. We show that the entry threat of a less-productive
manufacturer is welfare decreasing when there is an exclusive dealing
contract between the incumbent manufacturer and distributor. This
result is in contrast to the view of the contestable markets literature.
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1 Introduction
The e⁄ects of exclusive dealing contracts have been a controversial subject
among economists for more than 20 years. In recent times, several papers
such as Fumagalli and Motta (2006) and Simpson and Wickelgren (2007)
have made important contributions. They have focused on manufacturer-
distributor structures and explored that the results are di⁄erent from the
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1case of the manufacturer-￿nal buyer structure. However, those papers con-
sider the case of only one entrant. As Whinston (2004) states, the literature
has been limited to ￿one buyer and several sellers, or between one seller
and several buyers￿(pp.175). To answer more realistic questions, ￿models
with competing sellers and more than one buyer￿ and ￿[f]urther study of
multiseller/multibuyer models￿should be a high priority (pp.177). This pa-
per focuses on the exclusive dealing contracts in a manufacturer-distributor
structure and introduces potential entrants in both the manufacturing and
distribution sectors. Using this setting, we challenge the question raised by
Whinston.
We will show that weak entrants have a crucial role for understanding
the e⁄ects of exclusive dealing contracts on social welfare. Those entrants
may become the main reason for the exclusive dealing contract to decrease
social welfare. In other words, we will present the possibility that an entry
threat may become a harmful mechanism for social welfare. This result is in
contrast to the view of the contestable markets literature (the seminal work
is Baumol et al. (1982)).
More precisely, we consider a situation wherein there is one incumbent
manufacturer and one incumbent distributor. A new distributor whose pro-
ductivity is higher than that of the incumbent is going to enter the market.
Hence, the incumbent distributor has an incentive to o⁄er an exclusive deal-
ing contract to the incumbent manufacturer and attempts to exclude the ef-
￿cient entrant. Furthermore, we assume that a new manufacturer will enter
the market. The productivity of the new manufacturer is private information
and unknown to the other parties, who only know that the productivity of
the new manufacturer is lower than that of the incumbent manufacturer. We
will show that this ine¢ cient entrant in the manufacturing sector decreases
the total welfare.
It is well-known that a potential entry threat is welfare increasing (more
rigorously, not welfare decreasing) under the price competition with a ho-
mogenous product, even though the potential entrant is weak (less produc-
tive). For example, the unit cost of an incumbent producer is 10. If there is
no entrant, this incumbent can charge a monopoly price, say for example 20.
On the other hand, if there is a potential entrant whose unit cost is 15, the
incumbent cannot charge a monopoly price. It has to decrease the market
price to 15 in order to compete with the entrant. Hence, the existence of this
potential entrant is welfare increasing. This point is generalized by the con-
testable markets theory that claims that potential entrants improve welfare
2through potential competition, regardless of whether entrants are e¢ cient or
not.
In this paper, however, we will show that this result is not applicable when
there is an exclusive dealing contract. An entrant can decrease social welfare
when incumbents signed exclusive dealing contracts. In order to consider
this point clearly, we focus on large and strong distributors who posses strong
bargaining power over manufacturers. A famous example is Wal-Mart. Many
papers pointed out the strong bargaining power of Wal-Mart (e.g., Moore
(1993), Norek (1997) ). As stressed by Comanor and Rey (2000), such large
distributors are quite popular in the real world. Comanor and Rey presented
the case of Belk and that of Toys ￿ R￿Us (TRU). TRU is the largest toy retailer
in the United States, and it had attempted to deter rival retailers, as we will
examine below.1 Antitrust authorities have become increasingly concerned
about distributors￿such strong bargaining power (for example, Competition
Commission (2000), Federal Trade Commission (2001)). Inderst and Sha⁄er
(2007) examined the relation between the bargaining power of distributors
and the variety choice of manufacturers. Thus, it is natural and important
to focus on the cases of such large and strong distributors.
How can we obtain such a counter-intuitive result? The exclusive dealing
contract o⁄ered by the incumbent distributor is a key element. As explored
by Aghion and Bolton (1987), an exclusive dealing contract functions not only
as an entry-deterrence device but also as a rent-extraction device by setting
an appropriate level of liquidation damage. Hence, if the new distributor is
expected to be more e¢ cient than the incumbent distributor, the incumbent
may not deter the entry via the exclusive dealing contract. Rather, it sets the
liquidation damage level such that the incumbent manufacturer has an incen-
tive to breach the exclusive contract and pay the liquidation damage. Hence,
without an entrant in the manufacturing sector, an e¢ cient transaction (in-
cumbent manufacturer trades with the entrant distributor) is realized even
under the exclusive dealing contract, and the incumbent distributor obtains
the liquidation damage. With the possibility of entry into the manufactur-
ing sector, however, this mechanism does not function properly. If the exact
cost of the new manufacturer is unknown to the other parties, the incumbent
distributor cannot set an appropriate level of liquidation damage to extract
all rents realized by the e¢ cient players since it must be dependent upon the
1As we will see later, however, most of the previous models in the exclusive dealing
contract literature assumed strong manufacturers.
3cost level of the entrant. Thus, there is a possibility that the ine¢ cient en-
trant in the manufacturing sector replaces the e¢ cient incumbent and trades
with the new e¢ cient distributor. This trade decreases the total welfare.
Economists have extensively examined whether exclusive dealing con-
tracts actually deter e¢ cient entrants and decrease social welfare.2 In the
1970s, the so-called Chicago school argued that any vertical contracts could
not deter e¢ cient entry. The pioneering works are Posner (1976) and Bork
(1978). They argued that in order to induce signing an exclusive dealing
contract, a high cost (ine¢ cient) incumbent must compensate the potential
loss arising from the contract. Hence, by considering the compensation, it
is not pro￿table for the ine¢ cient incumbent to o⁄er the exclusive dealing
contract.
In contrast, Aghion and Bolton (1987) have shown that an exclusive con-
tract with liquidation damage, that is ￿the penalty to be paid when a party
breaches the contract and deals with an e¢ cient new comer￿can deter ef-
￿cient entry. Such a contract enables an ine¢ cient incumbent to survive in
the market by precluding entry because the liquidation damage imposes an
entry cost on a potential entrant. Moreover, even in the event of a new entry,
the incumbent can still extract some of the surplus that the e¢ cient entrant
brings to the market by gaining the entry fee. In this case, the externality
of contracts makes an exclusive dealing contract pro￿table for the ine¢ cient
incumbent.3
In recent times, Fumagalli and Motta (2006) treated the cases where buy-
ers are not ￿nal consumers. They have assumed that buyers are distributors,
as in our model. Fumagalli and Motta (2006) extended the models of Ras-
musen et al. (1991) and Segal and Whinston (2000). They have clearly
shown the conditions wherein su¢ cient competition among buyers in the
downstream markets prevents the incumbent from using exclusive dealing
contracts. This factor has an implication that the intensity of competition
in the downstream markets might be crucial for judging the e⁄ects of an
exclusive dealing contract.
Simpson and Wickelgren (2007) also treat the case where buyers are not
￿nal consumers, but their main focus is on the possibility of a breach of
contract. They examined the roles of exclusive dealing contract when buyers
2Rey and Tirole (2007) provide a concise survey on papers on this topic.
3In contrast, Innes and Sexton (1994) have shown that by adding exclusive dealing
contracts between entrants and buyers to the Aghion and Bolton model, e¢ cient entrants
are never deterred.
4can breach the exclusive dealing contract and pay expectation damages. They
also employ the settings of Rasmusen et al. (1991) and Segal and Whinston
(2000), but the results are in contrast to those of Fumagalli and Motta (2006).
Simpson and Wickelgren have shown that exclusive dealing contracts can
ine¢ ciently deter entry if buyers are downstream competitors.4
The situation considered in this paper is similar to that of Fumagalli and
Motta (2006) and Simpson and Wickelgren (2007). We assume that buyers
are distributors and consider manufacturer-distributors relations. However,
there are several crucial di⁄erences. First, we consider an entrant even in the
distribution sector in addition to the manufacturing sector. Second, since
we consider the large distributor case, the incumbent distributor o⁄ers an
exclusive dealing contract to the incumbent manufacturer. Third, the penalty
for breaching the exclusive dealing contract is assumed to be a liquidation
damage as in Aghion and Bolton (1987). Finally, the entrant manufacturer
is weak and less productive than the incumbent manufacturer.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 explains the basic model
and analyzes a case without any exclusive dealing contracts as a benchmark.
Section 3 provides the optimal contracts with an ine¢ cient entrant manufac-
turer. Section 4 deals with the optimal contracts without no entrant man-
ufacturer and considers the implications for the contestable markets theory.
Finally, Section 5 provides some concluding remarks.
2 Model
2.1 Basic Structure
We consider a model with a simple vertical structure. Players are manufac-
turers (sellers), distributors (buyers), and consumers. Manufacturers produce
a homogenous good. The constant marginal cost for an incumbent manufac-
turer (IM) is denoted by cI. IM faces an entrant manufacturer (EM). EM￿ s
constant marginal cost, cE, is her private information, and the other players
only know that cE is uniformly distributed in [cE;cE]. Hereafter, we will
focus on an ine¢ cient upstream entrant case by assuming that EM￿ s cost,
4When distributors are homogenous and compete a la Bertrand, no entry deterrence
occurs in their model. However, Simpson and Wickelgren (2007) treat this situation as an
extreme case of monopolistic competition that induces entry deterrence with an exclusive
dealing contract between incumbents and distributors.
5cE , is uniformly distributed in [cI;cE], and let us de￿ne C ￿ cE ￿ cI.5 At
the distribution level, there is a single incumbent distributor (ID) with unit
distribution cost dI and an entrant distributor (ED) with unit distribution
cost dE(< dI), that is, ED is more e¢ cient than ID.6 There is no entry cost,
and ￿xed costs are zero for all players. ID has an incentive to exclude ED
by using exclusive dealing contracts as will be explained below. The cost
conditions of these four players are summarized in Figure 1.
Since there is no entry cost and no uncertainty about the entries, the
di⁄erence between the incumbents and the entrants denotes the possibility
of signing an exclusive dealing contract. Only the incumbents have an op-
portunity to write exclusive dealing contracts.
With regard to the consumers￿side, we assume a simple structure. All
consumers have the same preference, and the reservation price for the prod-
uct is v. Each consumer buys at most only one unit of the product, and we
set the number of consumers as 1 for simplicity. In order to avoid unnec-
essary complications, we assume that v is su¢ ciently high, and all possible
transactions are pro￿table for consumers, that is, v > dI + cE. We assume
that all players are risk neutral. Under these assumptions, the transaction
between IM and ED is e¢ cient and socially optimal.
The timing of the game is as follows: at t = 0, the incumbent distributor
o⁄ers the incumbent manufacturer a exclusive dealing contract. Then, at
t = 1, EM and ED enter the markets. We assume that EM￿ s cost, cE, is
unobservable throughout these two periods. Therefore, contracts at t = 0
cannot be contingent upon cE. Finally, after the con￿rmation of consumer￿ s
purchase, productions and trades take place.
2.2 No Exclusive Dealing Contract (a benchmark)
In this subsection, we focus on the case wherein there is no exclusive dealing
contract at t = 1 as a benchmark case. The time line of decisions at t = 1 is
as follows. First, each distributor chooses a manufacturer and simultaneously
5We assume an ine¢ cient upstream entrant for simplicity. Even if we assume that EM
can be more e¢ cient than IM with some probabilities, the qualitative results of this paper
are not a⁄ected.
6In this sense, we can see that our model is an extension of Comanor and Rey￿ s (2000)
model with e¢ cient downstream entrants and weak upstream entrants. Comanor and Rey
(2000), however, exclude the possibility of trade between entrants, i.e., between EM and
ED, by assumption.
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o⁄ers a take-it-or-leave-it o⁄er since we assume that distributors have strong
bargaining power over manufacturers, as explained in the introduction. We
denote wi
j as a wholesale price o⁄ered by distributor i (i = ID or ED) to
a manufacturer j (j = IM or EM). Second, each manufacturer determines
whether to accept each o⁄er. Since we do not assume any capacity constraint
for the production, manufacturers may accept two o⁄ers. We assume a dis-
tributor cannot cancel an o⁄er if it is accepted by a manufacturer. If an
o⁄er is rejected, the distributor has a chance to o⁄er a wholesale price to the
other manufacturer. 7 However, one might imagine the situation wherein a
second-round o⁄er from a distributor is impossible due to time constraints
or other reasons. Hence, we will examine such cases in Appendix. Third, ID
and ED simultaneously o⁄er their retail price to consumers given the deci-
sions of manufacturers. P i is the retail price o⁄ered by distributor i. Finally,
consumers choose a distributor and determine whether to buy the product.
Next, we examine the equilibrium outcome of this game. It is the opti-
7It is assumed that a distributor does not make o⁄ers to the two manufacturers simul-
taneously since the distributor has to sell two units of the product if the two o⁄ers are
accepted.
7mal strategy for each manufacturer to accept an o⁄er as long as the o⁄ered
wholesale price is not lower than her unit cost, since o⁄ers from distribu-
tors are of take-it-or-leave type and no capacity constraints exist. Given this
optimal strategy of manufacturers, the optimal strategy of each distributor
is to o⁄er a wholesale price to IM equivalent to IM￿ s marginal cost. Then,
wID
IM = wED
IM = cI . Moreover, no distributor makes an o⁄er to EM, because
it is commonly known that cE 2 [cI;cE].
Hence, when no exclusive dealing contracts are signed, the minimum total
costs for ID (ED), denoted by TCI (TCE), can be written as
TC
I = cI + dI
TC
E = cI + dE:
Given these cost conditions, ID and ED decide P i (i = I or E) simulta-






I = cI + dI
Then, ED wins the Bertrand competition and obtains a pro￿t dI ￿ dE.
This outcome is quite consistent with the standard Bertrand competition
outcome. The production cost is minimized by the competition and only
the e¢ cient distributor obtains a positive pro￿t.8 Since a new manufacturer
is less e¢ cient than the incumbent manufacturer, the unknown cost, cE,
does not a⁄ect the market equilibrium outcome. In the next section, we will
examine how this outcome will be a⁄ected by the exclusive dealing contracts.
3 E⁄ects of the Exclusive Dealing Contract
Now, we introduce a simple exclusive dealing contract. ID o⁄ers IM an exclu-
sive dealing contract that stipulates no transaction with the new distributor,
8More precisely, there might exist an incentive problem of ID. Since ID expects that
she cannot win the retail price competition, ID has no incentive to o⁄er to IM. If so,
the pricing of ED may become more higher. Such complicated probrem can be avoided,
as implicitly assumed in the literature, by assuming that a wholesale contract is just a
￿reservation contract￿ , i.e., if a distributor cannot con￿rm the consumers￿purchases, she
does not have to buy the product, or ID has a chance to (re)o⁄er to manufacturers even
afther the retail pricing of ED.
8ED, and the penalty level, h0, in the case of a breach. Here, h0 denotes the
liquidation damage that IM has to pay for ID as a penalty when IM breaches
this contract to trade with ED. As mentioned above, the new manufacturer￿ s
exact cost, cE, is unknown to both contracting parties. They only know of
the existence of an entrant, EM, and the distribution of cE is uniform in
[cI;cE]. Hence, the exclusive dealing contract cannot be contingent upon the
realized cE.
Before deriving the optimal contract, i.e., the optimal level of liquidation
damage, h￿
0, we examine the competitive equilibrium, given h0. When a
given exclusive dealing contract is signed, the entrant distributor bears an
additional cost, h0, if it buys from the incumbent manufacturer.
Based on these cost conditions, the competition outcome becomes di⁄er-
ent from the no-contract case. Each distributor￿ s minimized total cost can
be written as
TC




cI + h0 + dE if wED
EM < cE (wED
EM : rejected)
wED
EM + dE if wED
EM ￿ cE (wED
EM : accepted) (2)
If wED
EM < cE, EM rejects ED￿ s o⁄er, and ED makes an o⁄er to IM after
the rejection. Thus, TCE = cI + h0 + dE. We should note that if ED
contracts with IM, ID does not compete with ED even when TCI < TCE.
The reason is as follows. Based on the price competition, ID can obtain
cI + h0 + dE ￿ (cI + dI) > 0, when TCI < TCE. However, we can see that
this pro￿t is lower than h0:
cI + h0 + dE ￿ (cI + dI) = h0 + (dE ￿ dI) < h0:
Hence, it is better for the incumbent distributor to avoid the price com-
petition and receive the penalty from the incumbent manufacturer. In this
situation, there are multiple Nash equilibria. All combinations such as P I,
which is higher than TCE, and P E, which is slightly lower than P I (or v
if P I is higher than v), are Nash equilibria. Here, we simply assume that a
Nash equilibrium that maximizes the pro￿t of ED is chosen.9 In other words,
9If PI is lower than v, the pro￿t of ED becomes more lower and the possibility that
ED trades with EM should be raised. That is, the possibility of ine¢ cient outcome should
become higher than we are considering in this setting.
9ID will set its price higher than v and ED will set its price as P E = v: Under
this equilibrium, ED obtains v ￿ (cI + h0 + dE) and ID obtains h0:10 In this
situation, we can easily observe that the total welfare is maximized since IM
trades with ED; thus, the maximum total welfare v￿ (cI + dE) is realized.
On the other hand, if wED
EM ￿ cE, EM accepts ED￿ s o⁄er this time, TCE
becomes wED
EM + dE and TCI becomes cI + dI. Hence, if TCI ￿ TCE, ED
earns a positive pro￿t cI + dI ￿ (wED
EM + dE). However, if TCI < TCE, ED
loses the retail price competition and obtains nothing.






v ￿ (cI + h0 + dE) if wED
EM < cE
cI + dI ￿ (wED
EM + dE) if wED
EM ￿ cE; cI + dI ￿ (wED
EM + dE) ￿ 0
0 if wED
EM ￿ cE; cI + dI ￿ (wED
EM + dE) < 0
(3)
Since ED knows that TCI is cI +dI, it is not optimal for ED to set wED
EM
that makes cI +dI ￿(wED
EM +dE) < 0. Hence, hereafter, we characterize only
the cases where cI + dI ￿ dE ￿ wED
EM. Because cE is a random variable for














Next, we derive the optimal wED
EM, denoted by w￿
E. ED sets w￿
E to max-
imize the above expected payo⁄. We should be careful, however, that it is
always possible for ED to o⁄er IM and not to o⁄er wED
EM: By o⁄ering to IM,
ED can obtain v￿(cI +h0+dE) as explained above. Hence, ED￿ s maximized
pro￿t must be higher than v￿(cI +h0+dE). Based on this point, we obtain
the following lemma.
Lemma 1 : If v ￿ cI + dI + h0, ED o⁄ers w￿
E =
3cI+dI￿v+h0
2 to EM. If
v > cI + dI + h0, ED does not o⁄er to EM and o⁄ers wED
IM = cI + h0 to IM.
Proof. Since cE 2 [cI;cE], wED
EM should be higher than cI. This implies that
the maximum value of dI ￿ dE ￿ wED
EM + cI is dI ￿ dE. Hence, if v ￿ (cI +
h0 + dE) ￿ (dI ￿ dE) = v ￿ (cI + dI + h0) > 0, ED has no incentive to o⁄er
10In general, there is a possibility that v ￿ (cI + h0 + dE) may become negative if h0
is very high. However, setting such high h0 is not optimal for the ID. Thus, we only
characterize the cases where v ￿ (cI + h0 + dE) is positive.
10to EM. On the other hand, if v ￿ cI + dI + h0, wED
EM is chosen to maximize




3cI + dI ￿ v + h0
2
: (5)
Next, we con￿rm that this w￿
E satis￿es cI+dI￿dE ￿ wED
EM. cI+dI￿dE￿w￿
E =
fv ￿ (cI + h0 + dE) + dI ￿ dEg=2 > 0.
Given this strategy of ED, ID determines the level of liquidation damage,
h0. When ED trades with IM, ID can obtain h0. On the other hand, ID
receives 0 when ED trades with EM, since ED always chooses the level of
wED








C )h0 = f1 ￿ 1
C(
3cI+dI￿v+h0
2 ￿ cI)gh0 if v ￿ cI + dI + h0
h0 if v ￿ cI + dI + h0
(6)
From the expected pro￿t function, we obtain the following lemma.













3cI + dI ￿ v + h0
2
=
5cI + dI ￿ v + 2C
4
: (8)
If v ￿ cI + dI + 2C, h￿
0 = v ￿ cI ￿ dI:
Proof. By maximizing f1￿ 1
C(
3cI+dI￿v+h0





0 satis￿es v ￿ cI + dI + h￿
0, h￿
0 denotes h0 that maximizes E[￿ID].
Since v ￿ cI + dI + h￿
0 () v ￿ cI + dI +
2C+v￿cI￿dI







4 . On the other hand, if v > cI+dI+h￿
0,
E[￿ID] is obviously maximized at h0 = v ￿ cI ￿ dI:
From the Lemma, we obtain the following proposition.
11Proposition 1 :As long as v ￿ cI + dI + 2C, the exclusive dealing contract
o⁄ered by an incumbent distributor generates ine¢ ciency since the e¢ cient
distributor, ED, trades with the ine¢ cient manufacturer, EM, and supplies




v > cI+dI+2C, the exclusive dealing contract does not generate ine¢ ciency.
Proof. As long as v ￿ cI +dI +2C, h￿
0 =
2C+v￿cI￿dI














4C , the o⁄er by ED
is accepted by EM, and the ine¢ cient transaction between ED and EM is
realized.
The intuition of this proposition is natural. By the exclusive dealing
contract, the o⁄er to IM is not so attractive for ED. Thus, unless h0 is
su¢ ciently low, ED has an incenitive to trade with the ine¢ cient entrant EM.
On the other hand, such h0 level is too low for ID as long as v ￿ cI +dI +2C,
and thus ID chooses the optimal level of h0 which may generate the ine¢ cient
transaction.
If the actual cE is less than or equal to w￿
E, EM accepts the o⁄er and the
combination of EM-ED wins the retail market competition. On the other
hand, if cE is larger than w￿
E, EM rejects the o⁄er, and ED has to trade
with IM by paying the liquidation damage. Figure 2 depicts the equilibrium
manufacturer-distributor structure depending on the EM￿ s actual cost.
Here, we have assumed that ED has a chance to contract and trade with
IM even after the rejection of EM. In some cases, however, the second round
o⁄er may be impossible. In Appendix, we will examine such cases and get
similar result. Even if the second round o⁄er is prohibited, there is a possi-
bility that the exclusive dealing contract o⁄ered by an incumbent distributor
generates ine¢ ciency.
We should note that under the equilibrium exclusive dealing contract, the
entrant distributor is not excluded at all. ED always supplies the product
to consumers. However, if the level of cE is low, however, the ine¢ cient
manufacturer, EM, can survive and supply the product. This result is quite
in contrast with the results in the traditional literature. In the literature, an
e¢ cient entrant is excluded by the exclusive dealing contract. This paper has
derived a di⁄erent possibility by considering multiple entrants. This factor
has an important implication for the competition policy. We will examine
this point more carefully in Section 5.
12Figure 2:
Next, we examine the possibility of renegotiation. The argument of
Aghion and Bolton (1987) is criticized that by considering renegotiation,
ine¢ cient outcomes do not emerge (Masten and Snyder (1989) and Spier
and Whinston (1995)).11 We now examine whether our argument is a⁄ected
by allowing the possibility of renegotiation.
In our setting, the renegotiation possibility implies renegotiation regard-
ing the liquidation damage level, h0. Under the settings of Aghion and
Bolton, if the level of liquidation value can be renegotiated after the real-
ization of a random variable, the ine¢ ciency should disappear. One huge
di⁄erence between our settings and those of Aghion an Bolton (1987) is that
cE is private information and not a random variable. Hence, it is di¢ cult to
perceive a renegotiation possibility similar to that of Aghion and Bolton.
However, the decision of EM may convey some information regarding the
cost condition of EM. If EM accepts the o⁄er from ED, it is revealed that
EM￿ s cost is lower than the o⁄ered price, wED
EM. Even if ID (and IM) received
this information, it is di¢ cult to readjust the contracted liquidation damage
level since EM has already accepted the o⁄er from ED at that time. ED
11Simpson and Wickelgren (2007) also pointed out this argument.
13cannot change its partner to IM, and thus, the reduction of h0 does not
change the outcome in our model.
This outcome is not a⁄ected even if we consider the possibility that ED
pays a penalty for a breach of the contract to EM and make a contract with
IM. For the breach of the contract, ED has to pay at least w￿
E. In this case,
ED￿ s total cost with IM becomes cI + h0 + dE + w￿
E, and it is larger than
dE+w￿
E even if the reduced liquidation damage level, h0, is zero. Hence, even
after allowing for renegotiation, the results of this paper are not a⁄ected.
4 The Optimal Contracts with No Entrant
Manufacturer
In this section, we examine the optimal exclusive contract when no entrant
manufacturer exists. We will show that there is no ine¢ ciency in this case
even if an exclusive dealing contract is signed by the incumbents.
Before deriving the optimal contract, we should examine the no-contract
payo⁄s of each player. Without any exclusive dealing contracts, there is a
unique subgame perfect equilibrium. IM accepts wholesale price o⁄ers from
both ID and ED, and the equilibrium wholesale prices are wID
IM = wED
IM = cI.
Then, ID and ED compete a la Bertrand with TCI = cI + dI and TCE =
cI + dE. Thus, the market price becomes P ￿ = TCI = cI + dI, and only ED
obtains a positive pro￿t dI ￿dE. Hence, both incumbents cannot obtain any
positive pro￿t. In this model, we have assumed that distributors can o⁄er
take-it-or-leave-it o⁄ers, and thus, distributors have strong bargaining power
and IM obtains zero pro￿t even though IM is in a monopoly position.
Next, we derive the optimal exclusive dealing contract as we did in Section
3. Suppose the liquidation damage level, h0, was contracted between the
incumbents at t = 0. This implies that ED has to pay h0 additionally to
buy from IM. Hence, the equilibrium wholesale price o⁄ering strategies are
wI
I = cI and wE
I = cI + h0, and the total cost of the distributors becomes
TC
I = cI + dI
TC
E = cI + h0 + dE:
14Even if dI ￿ dE < h0, i.e. TCI < TCE. ID will not compete with ED,
because if it competes, the market price becomes P ￿ = TCE = cI + h0, and
ID￿ s pro￿t becomes ￿ID = h0 ￿ dI + dE < h0. Hence, ID avoids the price
competition and gets the liquidation damage h0 by o⁄ering P I > v.12
If dI ￿ dE ￿ h0, P ￿ = TCI = cI + dI , ED wins the competition, and ID
obtains ￿ID = h0. Hence, ID can obtain h0 anyway, the pro￿t maximization





s:t: 0 ￿ h0 ￿ v ￿ cI ￿ dE
Obviously, h￿
0 = v￿cI, and the equilibrium consumer price o⁄er becomes
P ￿ = v. Clearly, ID obtains all surplus by liquidation damages. Each player￿ s
payo⁄ is as follows:
￿





Since the optimal combination IM-ED is realized, there is no welfare loss.
It is evident from this result that without entrants at the manufacturing
level, there is no social ine¢ ciency. The e¢ cient new distributor can enter
the market. The rent extraction device, h0, makes ID absorb all the surplus
that the e¢ cient ED would obtain. When we compare this result with the
potential ine¢ cient manufacturer entrant case shown above, the potential
entrants enable such exclusive dealing contracts to induce ine¢ cient entry.
Proposition 2 : When no potential entrant exists in the upstream side of
the market, the optimal exclusive dealing contract does not deter an e¢ cient
entry, and there is no welfare loss.
12As noted in the previous section, all combinations such that PI which is higher than
TCE, and PE, which is slightly lower than PI (or v if PI is higher than v), are Nash
equilibria. Here, we simply assume that a Nash equilibrium that maximizes the pro￿t of
ED is chosen.
15Proof. See above.
From this proposition, we understand that the entrant manufacturer is
crucial for the result in the previous section, that is, the optimal exclusive
dealing contract generates ine¢ ciency. The intuitive reason is that without
the entrant, the incumbent distributor can set the level of liquidation damage
appropriately and can absorb the rent completely. Hence, even with the
exclusive dealing contract, it does not decrease the total welfare in this simple
setting. In other words, the existence of the entrant in the manufacturing
sector and the asymmetric information about the cost level of the entrant
are crucial for the ine¢ ciency. This result is important in considering entry
threats. Our result implies that an entry threat does not increase the welfare
automatically even though the competition is homogenous and there is no
entry cost. This point is quite in contrast with the results of the contestable
markets theory. We can state that the relation between the entry threats
and exclusive dealing contracts are more complex than expected.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have focused on the exclusive dealing contracts in the
manufacturer-distributor structure aligned with two recent papers, namely,
Fumagalli and Motta (2006) and Simpson and Wickelgren (2007). We intro-
duced potential entrants in both the manufacturer and distributor sides and
shown that exclusive dealing contracts may decrease the social welfare in this
new environment. Fumagalli and Motta (2006) and Simpson and Wickelgren
(2007) have shown that, in the case of homogenous Bertrand competition,
e¢ cient entry always occurs with any exclusive dealing contract and no inef-
￿ciency occurs in the manufacturer-distributor structure. On the other hand
this paper has shown that even if the distributors compete with homoge-
nous price competition, the ine¢ cient result comes out. Hence, our result
shows that homogenous Bertrand competition in the distributor side is not
su¢ cient condition for realizing the social e¢ ciency.
In order to make clear the reason of the ine¢ ciency, we compared the re-
sults with or without ine¢ cient entrants. We have shown that with ine¢ cient
entrants in upstream, exclusive dealing contracts with liquidation damages
can facilitate ine¢ cient entries in the upstream side. Although e¢ cient en-
trants in downstream are not deterred, such an exclusive dealing contract is
16welfare reducing.
Our result has important implications for competition policies. Generally,
a competition policy focuses on whether entry is deterred by any contracts
between incumbents. Our result, however, shows that even if no entry is
deterred, ine¢ ciency might be generated. It is a natural situation wherein
entrants are less productive than the incumbent, and they enter the mar-
ket with e¢ cient new distributors. The result of this paper suggests that
the competition policy should be careful with regard to not only whether
entrants are deterred but also whether ine¢ cient transactions are promoted
by exclusive dealing contracts. This point is not derived by the traditional
one-entrant setting. Analysis of multiple entrants at both sides of the market
structure enable us to reach this new policy implication.
This paper has focused on the situation wherein distributors have strong
bargaining power. As the presence of Wal-Mart shows that this situation is
important for considering actual phenomena, and based on this setting, our
model has become very simple and tractable. Hence, it would serve as an
important work in future to reconsider traditional results by assuming that
downstream ￿rms have strong bargaining power. Moreover, we can imagine
that distributors are platforms that exert bargaining power on upstream man-
ufacturers and also the ￿nal consumer. To analyze platforms with exclusive
dealing contracts, two-sided market problems are important13. Although this
paper avoided such complicated problems and focused mainly on the e⁄ects
of exclusive dealing contracts, this is an important issue for future research.
A Appendix
In this appendix, we examine the case in which the second round o⁄er is
prohibited, that is, ED cannot o⁄er to IM if the o⁄er to EM is rejected. We
will show that even in this case, there is a possibility that social ine¢ ciency is
generated. First, we derive the pro￿t function of EM, given the o⁄ered price,
wE, and the liquidation damage level, h0. EM accepts the wholesale price
o⁄er, if wE ￿ cE, but EM rejects it and obtains no pro￿t, if wE < cE. Since
a second round o⁄er is impossible, ED also obtains no pro￿t. As explained
in Section 3, the market price is dI + cI in this case. Hence, the expected
13With regard to the two-sided market problems, see, for example, Rochet and Tirole
(2006).








(dI + cI ￿ dE ￿ w
E): (9)

























ED does not make an o⁄er to EM, and it o⁄ers to IM if the above expected
pro￿t is lower than v ￿ (cI + h0 + dI), that is the gain obtained by o⁄ering
to IM. Therefore, if v ￿ (cI + h0 + dI) ￿
(dI￿dE)2
4C , ED o⁄ers to IM and gets
v ￿ (cI + h0 + dI). On the other hand, if v ￿ (cI + h0 + dI) <
(dI￿dE)2
4C , ED




0 expecting the ED￿ s behavior. If the o⁄er from ED is re-
jected by EM, ED cannot supply the product, then ID obtains the monopoly
pro￿t v ￿ cI ￿ dI. On the other hand, if the o⁄er is accepted by EM, IM
cannot win the retail price competition and obtains zero pro￿t. Thus, the






2C )(v ￿ cI ￿ dI) if v ￿ cI ￿ dI ￿
(dI￿dE)2
4C < h0













the o⁄er from ED to EM and the ine¢ cient transaction between ED and EM.
We should note that in this high h0 case, the transaction is always ine¢ cient,
and there is a possibility that the e¢ cient distributor, ED, is excluded by the
exclusive dealing contract. More rigorously, when cI ￿ cE ￿
dI￿dE
2 + cI, the
EM-ED transaction is realized, and when
dI￿dE
2 + cI ￿ cE ￿ cE, the ID-IM
transaction is realized in the market.
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